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I Introduction
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 ('the PRA') provides that, after the
end of a marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship of three or more
years' duration, the parties' relationship property is equally shared unless
they have formally agreed otherwise or one of the limited exceptions to
equal division applies.' This article considers how the PRA interacts with
accident compensation entitlements. We approach this issue by asking:
* The 'classification question': when will an accident compensation
entitlement be 'relationship property'?
* The 'division question': do accident compensation entitlements that
are relationship property affect the division of relationship property?
The classification question received recent judicial attention from
Mander J in the High Court in Bowden v Bowden,2 a case concerning the
division of the estate of Gordon Bowden, who died of asbestosis in 2012.
He was survived by Judith Bowden,' his de facto partner of three years
and two days,' and his adult son from a prior marriage, Paul Bowden.
Mr Bowden was diagnosed with asbestosis in 2010, for which the
Accident Compensation Corporation accepted cover as a work-related
injury. It paid Mr Bowden lump sum compensation of almost $130,000
for his permanent physical impairment. Both the diagnosis and the ACC
payment occurred during his de facto relationship with Judith Bowden.
The exposure to asbestos, however, had occurred many years prior to that
Lecturer in Law, University of Otago.
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Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 11-14AA.
2 Bowden v Bowden [2016] NZHC 1201, [2017] NZFLR 56.
Mrs Bowden changed her surname to Bowden by deed poll shortly after
Mr Bowden's death, see Bowden v Bowden [2015] NZFC 8921 at [21].
4~ Whether the parties were in a de facto relationship and, if so, when it
commenced, were contested in the Family Court, see Bowden v Bowden
(FC), above n 3, at [8]-[91]. The Family Court found at [90] that the
relationship "moved to a new level" around late February to early March
2009 and Mr and Mrs Bowden became de facto partners at that time.
The Family Court fixed a date of 27 February as the date of commencement
of the relationship, being the date that Mrs Bowden give notice to her
landlord that she was terminating her tenancy. Given that the relationship
ended on 1 March 2012 when Mr Bowden died, the Family Court found at
[91] that the de facto relationship lasted three years and two days. Those
findings were not appealed.
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relationship when Mr Bowden was living and working in the UK. After
Mr Bowden's death, a dispute arose between his surviving partner and
his son over the division of his estate. Mr Bowden had made a will the day
before he died, appointing his son as the executor and leaving him all of
his estate. His estate comprised the family home, registered solely in his
name, some $30,000 in a bank account in his name, and about $100,000
in a bank account in the joint names of the deceased and his son, which
was found to be the balance of the ACC payment. Ms Bowden elected
option A under the PRA, seeking a division of the couple's relationship
property.6 She claimed that all of the estate was relationship property,
including the ACC funds, and that she was entitled to a half share.
The Court thus had to consider:
* Whether the compensation payment was relationship property and,
if so,
* whether the relationship property should be equally divided
between Ms Bowden and the estate.7
In regard to classification, neither the Family Court nor the High
Court considered the personal nature of the compensation. Applying
the PRA's classification system, the question was whether the right to
compensation accrued before or during the relationship.8 The Courts
came to different conclusions on that question. The Family Court found
that the right to compensation accrued when Mr Bowden suffered the
injury, which was when he was exposed to asbestos.9 Since that happened
many years prior to the commencement of the de facto relationship, the
compensation payment was Mr Bowden's separate property and thus
Ms Bowden had no entitlement to it. The High Court, on the other hand,
held that the right to compensation accrued on the date that the accident
compensation scheme deemed Mr Bowden to have suffered asbestosis,
which was the date upon which the condition was diagnosed.10 Since
diagnosis occurred during the relationship, the compensation payment
was relationship property and subject to division."
5 As the High Court observed in Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at [77] little
information is available regarding the circumstances of Mr Bowden's
claim and the subsequent compensation payment. We will take it as
a given that Mr Bowden obtained cover and then received lump sum
compensation for permanent impairment.
6 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 61.
7 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 13 and 14A allow for unequal
division. See further IIC below.
8 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(e).
9 Bowden v Bowden (Family Court), above n 3, at [124].
10 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 37. Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at
[79].
" In addition, that the condition arose during the relationship means that
there is no question that ACC could decide, on reasonable grounds, that
the main purpose of Mrs Bowden becoming Mr Bowden's partner was to
quality for ACC entitlements, which would have removed ACC's liability,
see Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 75(3).
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In regard to division, the High Court agreed with the Family Court
that there were extraordinary circumstances that made equal sharing
repugnant to justice, which is one of the exceptions to equal division,12
and that a division of 80:20 in favour of Mr Bowden was appropriate. 3
The relationship had lasted only three years and two days during
which time the parties had kept their finances entirely separate and
Mr Bowden's financial contributions had grossly exceeded Ms Bowden's
financial and non-financial contributions.1 4 However, in contrast to the
Family Court, where the ACC funds were not subject to division, they
were in the High Court. These funds would have added significantly
to the gross disparity in contributions, but the High Court did not refer
to the ACC payments when addressing the division question and did
not appear to see the increased disparity as a reason to adjust the 80:20
split in Mr Bowden's favour.5 The personal nature of the compensation
was not mentioned.
Our concern is that the PRA does not allow the personal nature of
accident compensation entitlements to be addressed appropriately.
We begin with an overview of the relevant mechanics of the PRA and
the Accident Compensation Act 2001 ('the ACA'). We will then discuss
how the courts have analysed accident compensation entitlements
in the context of relationship property claims. That discussion will
reveal a poor alignment between the PRA and the ACA and conceptual
difficulties, which have led to problems in application. We will conclude
by suggesting reform to clarify the interaction between the PRA and the
ACA.
II Overview of Relationship Property Entitlements
The PRA treats a marriage, civil union, or a de facto relationship that
has lasted for three or more years as a partnership to which the parties
are presumed to contribute equally, albeit in different ways.16 Hence,
there is a presumption that the property associated with the relationship
will be shared equally when the relationship ends. 7 Equal division of
relationship property is intended to reflect the parties' equal contribution
12 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13.
1 See Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at [8] for a summary of the factors that
the Family Court considered relevant.
14 See Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at [8] for a summary of the factors that
the Family Court considered relevant.
15 Interestingly, both the Family Court and the High Court dealt with s 13
before considering whether the ACC funds were part of the relationship
property.
16 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 1M(b) and 1N(a) and (b). Reid v Reid
[1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA).
17 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 11-14AA.
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to the partnership.' 8 In keeping with this principle, only "relationship
property" is shared.19 'Separate property' is retained by the owner.
A Meaning of property
The PRA applies to "property" that is beneficially owned by either of
the parties.20 Property is defined as including: 21
* real property:
* personal property:
* any estate or interest in any real property or personal property:
* any debt or any thing in action:
* any other right or interest.
Although this definition is similar to property definitions in other
statutes,2 suggesting a conventional understanding of the concept,
property is a social construct and has been viewed as a fluid concept
in the context of the PRA. 23 As the Supreme Court observed recently in
Clayton v Clayton, affirming a much earlier observation of the Court of
Appeal in Z v Z No 2, "its meaning and scope [is] affected by the statutory
and wider context (including changing social values, economic interests
and technological developments) in which it is used". 24
When construing its meaning in the context of social legislation, such
as the PRA, traditional concepts of property may be broadened to include
rights and interests that would not be regarded as property in other
contexts. 5 In Clayton the combination of powers held by the husband
in relation to a trust were held to constitute property for purposes of his
wife's PRA claim.26 So was the husband's entitlement to super profits
in Z v Z No 2.27
18 Z v Z (No 2) [1997] 2 NZLR 258 (CA) at 267, citing the second reading
of the Matrimonial Property Bill at NZPD vol 408, 7 December 1976 at
p 4565.
19 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 11. See II B below for an explanation
of "relationship property".
20 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2, definition of "owner".
21 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2, definition of "property".
22 For example, the Property Law Act 1952, Crimes Act 1961, Child Support
Act 1991 and the Family Proceedings Act 1980.
2 Z v Z (No 2), above n 18, at 279.
24 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 at [30], referring with approval to
Z v Z (No 2), above n 18, at 279.
2 Clayton v Clayton, above n 24, at [38].
26 Mr Clayton's extensive powers in relation to the Vaughan Road Property
Trust allowed him to appoint all of the capital and income of the trust to
himself without being constrained by fiduciary duties: Clayton v Clayton,
above n 24, at [58].
27 The super profits are the earnings the husband would receive as a partner
in excess of the remuneration for his owns skills and effort. These earnings
were part of the bundle of rights associated with the husband's interest
in the accountancy partnership: Z v Z (No 2), above n 18, at 291.
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However, property is confined to rights in things. It does not include
rights in respect of the person. A person's intelligence, memory, physical
strength, or sporting prowess are personal characteristics and part of
an individual's overall makeup. They are not property.2 8 That led the
Court of Appeal in Z v Z No 2 to conclude that the husband's enhanced
earning capacity was not property.29 Nor were the husband's business
skills and abilities in Thompson v Thompson.30 However, the payment that
the purchaser of Mr Thompson's business made for his restraint of trade
covenant was property, because that covenant protected the business
goodwill purchased by the buyer."' Mr Thompson's promise not to use
his skills and abilities to compete against the business he had sold was
part of the value of the business that the purchaser had bought.
B Classification
All property owned by either of the parties is classified as either
relationship property or separate property. Property that is not
relationship property is "separate property" .32 "Relationship property"
is exhaustively defined in the Act. 3 It includes the family home and
family chattels, whenever they were acquired;" all property owned by
the parties jointly or in common in equal shares;35 property acquired
by either party in contemplation of the relationship and intended for
the common use or common benefit of both parties;6 and all property
acquired by either party during the relationship,37 other than property
acquired from a third party by way of gift, succession, survivorship or as
a beneficiary of a trust settled by a third party. These excluded assets are
not produced by the partnership and hence remain the separate property
of the recipient partner unless the assets are, or have become part of, the
2 Z v Z (No 2), above n 18, at 279.
2 Z v Z (No 2), above n 18, at 280. That is still the position under the Property
(Relationships) Act 1976. The amendments made in 2001 did not change
the definition of property, or include earning capacity in its definition of
relationship property. Instead, it gave the Court power to compensate for
significant economic disparity resulting from the division of functions
during the marriage: Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 15. See Mark
Henaghan "Sharing Family Finances at the End of a Relationship" in
Jessica Palmer, Nicola Peart, Margaret Briggs and Mark Henaghan (eds)
Modern Family Finances - Legal Perspectives (Intersentia, Cambridge)
(forthcoming).
30 Thompson v Thompson [2014] NZCA 117, [2014] 2 NZLR 741 at [76];
Thompson v Thompson [2015] NZSC 26, [2015] 1 NZLR 593 at [53].
31 Z v Z (No 1) [1989] 3 NZLR 413 (CA) at 415; Thompson v Thompson (SC),
above n 30, at [71].
32 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9(1).
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 8-10.
34 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(a) and (b).
35 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(c)
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(d).
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(e).
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 10.
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family home or family chattels, 39 or they have become so intermingled
with relationship property, with the express or implied consent of the
owner, that it is unreasonable or impracticable to regard that property
as separate property.40
Consistent with the principle of recognising equal contributions to the
partnership, relationship property also includes an increase in value of
separate property if the increase is attributable either to the application of
relationship property or to the direct or indirect actions of the non-owning
partner.4 1 Similarly, the proportion of the value of any superannuation
scheme entitlement or life insurance policy that is attributable to the
relationship is relationship property.42
C Division
Unless the parties have formally contracted out of the Act, 43 the
presumption is that the relationship property will be divided equally
between the parties." This presumption is subject to three exceptions.
The first is where the relationship was of short duration (less than three
years); 45 the second is where there are extraordinary circumstances that
make equal sharing repugnant to justice;" and the third is where, after
separation, there is likely to be a significant disparity in income and
living standards between the parties caused by the division of functions
during the relationship.47 The second exception is the most relevant to
the question of division of ACC entitlements and is the only exception
considered here." Where this exception applies, the relationship property
is divided according to the parties' respective contributions to the
relationship.49
The extraordinary circumstances exception is very difficult to satisfy.
It sets a double threshold: there must be extraordinary circumstances and
those circumstances must make equal sharing repugnant to justice. The
39 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 10(4).
4o Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 10(2).
41 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9A.
42 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(g) and (f).
43 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 21.
44 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 11.
45 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 14-14AA.
46 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13.
47 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 15.
48 Under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 14, this exception applied
only to the matrimonial home and family chattels. Section 15 of that Act
provided for a more liberal exception to equal division for the balance of
matrimonial property. See further IVC below. Although the extraordinary
circumstances exception now applies to all relationship property, the
wording of the section has not changed, and hence the stringent approach
adopted under the original Act has continued under the amended Act.
As the High Court observed in De Malmanche v De Malmanche [2002] 2
NZLR 838 (HC) at [140]: "The lodestar of s 13 remains, but the ocean on
which it provides a navigational aid is of greater breadth."
49 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13.
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strong wording of the section indicates that "the legislature intended to
impose a rigorous test, allowing limited scope for unequal sharing"."
The exception is to be applied only to "those abnormal situations that
will demonstrably seem truly exceptional"," where the Court simply
cannot countenance equal division.52
The exception has been applied in cases where one party has failed
to contribute over a reasonable period of time; 3 where there is a gross
disparity in contributions, especially in a relatively short relationship,
as in Bowden v Bowden;" and where there has been a major injection of
separate property towards the end of the relationship that has become
relationship property through intermingling, such as an inheritance used
to repay a mortgage on the family home.55
III Overview of Accident Compensation Entitlements
A Introduction
This section provides a brief overview of accident compensation
entitlements for present purposes. 6 By 'accident compensation
entitlement', we mean a person's entitlement under New Zealand's
accident compensation scheme, whether or not they have yet received
it. A person has an accident compensation entitlement under the ACA if
they satisfy the criteria for "cover" for a personal injury and in addition
meet the specific criteria for the particular "entitlement" in question."
A "personal injury" means a physical injury, mental injury, or death.'
"Physical injury" can include gradual process, disease or infection
conditions, such as Mr Bowden's asbestosis, but the grounds for cover
for such conditions are narrower than for more common injuries, such as
a sprain or a cut.5 9 In Mr Bowden's case, cover would have been on the
so Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97 (CA) at 111.
s At 102.
52 Castle v Castle [1977] 2 NZLR 97 (HC) at 102.
53 For example, one party's negative contributions, such as excessive
spending on alcohol and gambling in Bevan v Bevan [1977] 1 MPC 23 (SC)
and embezzlement in Pickering v Pickering (1993) 11 FRNZ 240 (CA); or
moral deficiency, as in Banda v Hart (1998) 17 FRNZ 667 (FC) and H v M
(2001) 21 FRNZ 369 (DC). Non-intentional failure to contribute may also
constitute an extraordinary circumstance, as in D v D (1997) 15 FRNZ 302
(FC), where the wife's serious mental illness throughout 24-year marriage
prevented her from contributing equally to the partnership.
5 Bowden v Bowden, above n 2. See also Venter v Trenberth [2015] NZHC 545,
[2015] NZFLR 571 and Sydney v Sydney [2012] NZFC 2685.
5 Beuker v Beuker (1977) 1 MPC 20 (SC); Weber v Green-Weber (1990) 6 FRNZ
383 (HC); Crossan v Crossan (2003) 23 FRNZ 305 (FC).
56 This is an overview rather than a complete or precise account.
5 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 67.
5 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 26.
59 Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 26(2) and s 20(2)(e)h).
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basis that his condition was work-related.60 The most straight-forward
ground for cover is 'personal injury caused by accident'. The definition
of accident includes "a specific event", such as a motor vehicle crash
or a fall.61 For purposes of this paper we will assume that the recipient
of an accident compensation entitlement had cover and focus on the
entitlements to compensation arising from cover.
D Categories of entitlement
The ACA divides entitlements into four categories, which are useful
divisions for present purposes:
* Rehabilitation entitlements;6 2
* Lump sum compensation for permanent impairment;'
* Weekly compensation;6 " and
* Fatal entitlements.65
The first three categories of entitlement compensate a person for their
own injury, in contrast with fatal entitlements, which a person receives
as a result of the death of another person. Weekly compensation, lump
sum compensation and fatal entitlements are all compensatory in nature,
whereas rehabilitation entitlements are not. The nature and purpose of
the entitlements thus differ and require explanation before we consider
their treatment in relationship property proceedings.
1 Rehabilitation entitlements
Rehabilitation entitlements reflect the statutory purpose of:"
ensuring that, where injuries occur, the Corporation's primary focus
should be on rehabilitation with the goal of achieving an appropriate
quality of life through the provision of entitlements that restores to the
maximum practicable extent a claimant's health, independence, and
participation.
Some rehabilitation entitlements take the form of services to
the claimant, for example treatment, 67 home help, 6 8 or vocational
rehabilitation.69 Rehabilitation entitlements may also cover all or part
of the cost of acquiring or modifying assets for the purpose of social
rehabilitation. For example:
60 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 30 sets out the criteria for cover
for personal injury caused by work-related gradual process, disease or
infection.
61 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 25.
62 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, Part 1.
6 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, Part 3.
6 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, Part 2.
65 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, Part 4.
6 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 3(c).
67 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 1-6.
68 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 17.
69 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 24-29.
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* Aids and appliances,70 such as glasses, hearing aids, or a wheelchair;
* Pharmaceuticals;
* Transport for independence, 72 which includes the provision or
modification of a vehicle; and
* Housing modifications,"7 which could include significant changes
to a property, for example off-street parking with carport, lift access,
remodeling rooms, construction of a new bathroom, construction of
a caregiver's room and provision of access to outside cover.74
With respect to both transport for independence and housing
modifications, the ACA sets out a series of "rights and responsibilities", 7
several of which may be relevant in the context of relationship property
proceedings:
* ACC is not entitled to recover costs from a claimant if a claimant
moves from a modified house76 or disposes of a modified vehicle;'
* ACC is not required to return a home to its former state if the
claimant no longer occupies it,78 or to meet the cost of removing
vehicle modifications if they are no longer required;7 9
* ACC is not required to modify a home to which the claimant moves
from a modified home, unless ACC has already approved those
modifications;'
* ACC is not required to contribute to a replacement vehicle if a
claimant has a need for independence because they have, without
reasonable excuse, disposed of the existing vehicle.8
2 Lump sum compensation for permanent impairment
The lump sum compensation provisions are intended to compensate
"those who, through impairment, suffer non-economic loss" because of
the covered injury.82 "Impairment" is defined as "a loss, loss of use, or
70 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 13.
71 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 3(1)(c), pharmaceuticals are
classified as a service ancillary to treatment.
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 21-22.
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 18-19.
74 These example housing modifications were all found in Witten-Evans v
ACC DC 5 /2003, 22 January 2003 to be consistent with the Corporation's
obligations to provide social rehabilitation to a twelve year old who
suffered cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegia due to a medical
misadventure at birth.
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, c119 for housing modifications
and Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 22 for transport for
independence.
76 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, ci 19(4)(b).
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 22(5)(b).
78 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 1 9 (3 )(g).
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 22(2)(c).
" Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 22(3)(i).
81 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 22(2)(f)(ii).
82 Injury Prevention and Rehabilitation Bill 2000, Explanatory Note at 3.
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derangement of any body part, organ system, or organ function",' and
encompasses loss of mental as well as physical faculties.8 The provision
of compensation for permanent impairment reflects that, regardless
of whether a loss of bodily function has economic consequences, "it
is nonetheless a loss to the individual concerned, and in a greater or a
lesser degree may adversely affect him thereafter" .?
To qualify for a lump sum compensation, the claimant must first be
certified as having a permanent impairment which has stabilised, or
must wait for two years after the injury if their impairment is not yet
stable.8 Then, the claimant must have their whole-person impairment
assessed as a percentage figure. A claimant is entitled to lump sum
compensation if they are assessed as having 10 per cent or more whole-
person impairment.7 The quantum of the award increases with the level
of impairment. An impairment of 80 per cent or more, which Mr Bowden
appears to have had, qualifies for the maximum lump sum which, at the
time of writing, is around $133,000.
Lump sum compensation is exactly that: a one-off payment of a sum
of money to the claimant to compensate for their permanent impairment
for the rest of their life. Impairment can be re-assessed once every twelve
months,8 8 which can result in additional payments if the claimant's
whole-person impairment has increased. In that case, the additional
payment can be seen as acting as a new lump sum for the additional
level of impairment that has developed. An increase in impairment might
be because an injury has worsened, or may be the result of the claimant
having suffered further injury covered by the ACC scheme.
3 Weekly compensation
The purpose of weekly compensation is to compensate for lost earnings
due to injury. Entitlement requires the claimant to have been either an
earner or potential earner at the date of injury.89 Weekly compensation
8 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 6.
84 There is no provision for compensation for pai and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life, as was the case under the Accident Compensation
Act 1972 and Accident Compensation Act 1982.
85 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in
New Zealand Compensation for personal injury in New Zealand: Report of the
Royal Commission of Inquiry (Wellington, 1967) "The Woodhouse Report"
at [291].
8 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 57(1).
87 In addition, a claimant must survive their injury by 28 days and be alive
when assessed. Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 54(1)(b).
8 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 61.
8 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 100(1). A "potential earner" is defined
in s 6 as a claimant who suffered the personal injury before turning 18 or
during uninterrupted full time-study or training that commenced before
age 18.
178 (2017) Vol 15 No 1
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is based on eighty per cent of the claimant's pre-injury earnings."
Entitlement to weekly compensation requires the claimant to be
incapacitated from work because of their covered injury.9' Incapacity, and
accordingly entitlement to weekly compensation, may not be continuous
and can arise some time after the original injury.
4 Fatal entitlements
If a person dies as a result of an injury covered by the accident
compensation scheme, then various entitlements may be available
to their surviving spouse or partner,92 as well as their children,9 3 and
other dependants. 94 An "other dependant" of the deceased is a person
other than a child, partner or spouse of the deceased who, because of
their physical or mental condition, was financially dependent on the
deceased 95 and is deriving low earnings.96 Fatal entitlement are all
monetary payments aimed at compensating for economic loss suffered
as a result of an accidental death.
(a) Funeral grant
The purpose of a funeral grant is to contribute to the costs of the funeral
for someone who dies as a result of a covered injury. A funeral grant is
a one-off payment of the lesser of the actual costs of the funeral and a
statutory maximum. It is paid to the estate of the deceased claimant.97
(b) Survivor's child care payments'
The purpose of survivor's child care payments is to assist with the
90 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, d 32(3). The eighty per cent
figure has.been a feature of the ACC scheme since its inception, and
reflects a balance of considerations, including cost, fair compensation
for the individual based on their actual loss, and providing an incentive
for recovery. See The Woodhouse Report, above n 85, at [292]. Weekly
compensation for potential earners is the higher of 80 per cent of the
minimum wage and 125 per cent of the invalid's benefit, see Accident
Compensation Act 2001, s 47.
9 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 100(2). Entitlement is lost if the
claimant undergoes vocational rehabilitation and is assessed as having
vocational independence, see Accident Compensation Act 2001,
ss 102-106.
9 Defined in Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 18 and 18A respectively.
9 Defined in Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 6.
9 Defined in Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 6.
95 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 6.
96 To qualify as an "other dependant", a person's earnings must be less than
the greater of the minimum wage or 125 per cent of the supported living
payment under the Social Security Act 1964: Accident Compensation Act
2001, sch 1, cl 42(3).
9 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 64. The 2017 maximum is
around $6,000. The amount is increased each year based on movements
in the Consumer Price Index.
98 "Child care payments for children of deceased claimant", to use the
statutory language. Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 76.
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cost of child care for children of the deceased under the age of 14.
The entitlement is to payments "for child care"" rather than the provision
of child care. 0o Entitlement does not require an assessment of the need
for child care, or take into account the deceased's role in parenting.01
Payments are made weekly until the earlier of five years or the child
turning 14.102 The entitlement is strictly that of the child, but it is paid to
the child's caregiver.103
(c) Survivor's weekly compensation'"
The purpose of survivor's weekly compensation is to compensate the
family for the loss of income that the deceased claimant would have
contributed. Survivor's weekly compensation can be paid to a surviving
spouse or partner, children and other dependants of the deceased.
Entitled survivors are paid a proportion of the weekly compensation for
lost earnings that the deceased would have received had they lived. 05
For surviving spouses and partners, weekly compensation can continue
for five years (or longer in certain circumstances including when the
spouse or partner has the care of children under 18),'0 and can be
aggregated to a one-off payment in advance.10 7 A spouse's entitlement to
survivor's weekly compensation continues even if the surviving spouse
enters into a new relationship."0 For children, it continues until age 18
9 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 76(1).
100 In contrast with the social rehabilitation entitlement for ACC to "provide
or contribute to the cost of child care" for an injured claimant whose injury
affects their ability to care for their children (Accident Compensation Act
2001, sch 1, cl 15).
1o1 Again, in contrast with the social rehabilitation entitlement, which requires
consideration of factors such as the need for child care, "the extent to
which child care was provided by other household family members
before the claimant's personal injury" and "the extent to which other
household family members or other family members might reasonably
be expected to provide child care services after the claimant's personal
injury" (Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cls 15(1)(b), (c) and (d)).
102 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 77(2).
103 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 78(1).
1 The ACA does not use the phrase 'survivor's weekly compensation'. The
statutory language is "Weekly compensation for ... " "surviving spouse
or partner" (Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 66); "child" (cl
70), and "other dependants" (cl 71).
105 That is, survivor's weekly compensation is calculated based on eighty
per cent of the deceased's pre-injury earnings. Partners can receive up
to sixty per cent of that eighty per cent, children and other dependants
up to 20 per cent each. Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 66, 70,
71 and 74.
106 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, d 66(5). Clause 66(4)(b) provides
that The Corporation must not cancel or suspend the surviving spouse's
or partner's weekly compensation- (a) because the spouse or partner
marries, enters into a civil union, or enters into a de facto relationship.
10 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 67.
0 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 66.
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(or 21 if in full-time study).'" For other dependants, it continues until
the other dependant's earnings from other sources increase, or the other
dependant starts receiving New Zealand superannuation."o
(d) Survivor's grants
The purpose of a survivor's grant is to recognise that a death in a family
results in a "need for immediate cash" to address death-related expenses
in addition to those for which there are already specific entitlements."'
A survivor's grant is a one-off lump sum payment, payable to a surviving
spouse or partner, any child under 18, and any other dependant of the
deceased.11 2 At the time of writing, the grant to a spouse or partner is
around $6,500 and the grant to each child under 18 or other dependant
is around $3,200. Entitlement to a survivor's grant is contingent only on
having a qualifying relationship to the deceased. It is not based on an
assessment of loss or need.
In the next section we consider how the courts have treated these
various entitlements in proceedings under the PRA on separation and
on death of a spouse or partner.
IV How accident compensation entitlements have been dealt with
under the PRA
This section sets out how the courts have dealt with accident compensation
entitlements in relationship property proceedings by considering:
a. Whether accident compensation entitlements are 'property' under
the PRA?
b. If so, how are they classified?
c. If they are classified as relationship property, how are they
divided?
A Are accident compensation entitlements 'property'under the PRA?
The courts have had no difficult treating accident compensation
entitlements as property, which is clearly correct. Obviously, a payment
that ACC has made into a claimant's bank account is property, and assets
that have been provided or modified for the purposes of rehabilitation
are property. An entitlement is also property at the point at which the
claimant has acquired the right to receive it, even if it has not yet been
provided. The District Court took this approach in Storer v Storer, finding
that an interest in payment of lump sum compensation was property that
109 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 70(5).
110 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 72.
"' Hon W F Birch Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme (Wellington, 1991)
at 54. See also Ministerial Working Party on the Accident Compensation
Corporation and Incapacity Report (Wellington, 1991) at 88.
112 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 65. The clause explicitly allows
for the possibility of multiple spouses or partners. If there is more than
one surviving spouse or partner, the amount is divided equally between
them.
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was acquired prior to the payment actually being made."' Alternatively,
one could classify an entitlement to an accident compensation payment as
a 'thing in action'. An entitlement to quarterly independence allowance
payments was described as a "chose in action" in ACC v Bailey, 1 4 albeit
not in the relationship property context, and "a thing in action is simply
a modern rendering of what is conventionally called a chose in action",
as Tipping J put it in Gill v Gill."5 Regardless of whether an accident
compensation entitlement is classified as a 'thing in action' or 'other right
or interest' in the definition of 'property' in the PRA, it is incontrovertibly
property and has been treated as such. The more important questions
for present purposes relate to the classification and division of accident
compensation entitlements.
B How have accident compensation entitlements been classified under
the PRA?
Classification of property on separation differs from classification when
a relationship ends on death.
1 Accident compensation entitlements on separation
On separation, classification of accident compensation entitlements
made to an injured spouse or partner has arisen mostly in relation to
lump sum payments for permanent impairment, pain and suffering.
For purposes of classification under the PRA, the decisive question is
the date when the entitlement was acquired. Section 8(1)(e) of the PRA
provides that "all property acquired by either spouse or partner after
their marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship began" is relationship
property. If an entitlement to accident compensation is acquired before
a relationship commences, then the payment is separate property even
if it is made during the relationship, because the payment is property
acquired out of separate property.1 6 Conversely, if an entitlement arises
during a relationship, the payment is relationship property, even if it is
paid after separation, because the payment is property acquired out of
11 Storer v Storer (1984) 3 NZFLR 88 (DC) at 91.
114 ACC v Bailey DC Christchurch 152/2007 10 July 2007 at [21]. The case was
concerned with the Corporation's practice of offering claimants a "single
payment option" of a lump sum payment instead of five years' worth
of quarterly independence allowance payments, pursuant to Accident
Compensation Act 2001, s 123(2)(b), which allows the assignment of
an independence allowance to the Corporation for no more than five
years. Prior to Bailey, the Corporation advised clients taking up the
single payment option that they gave up the right to seek reassessment
during the five year period. The District Court found that the ACA
only authorised the assignment of the right to independence allowance
payments, and not the claimant's bundle of rights associated with the
independence allowance, including the right to reassessment (see [21]-
[22]).
"s Gill v Gill (1995) 13 FRNZ 427 (HC) at 433.
116 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9(2).
182 (2017) Vol 15 No 1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283460 
Accident Compensation Entitlements Under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 183
relationship property.1 7 The facts of Storer v Storer illustrate the latter
case." 8 During his marriage, Mr Storer lost an eye as a result of a motor
vehicle accident. He was paid lump sum compensation in relation to his
eye injury after he had separated from his wife, but the compensation
was still held to be relationship property.
The courts have rejected the proposition that the purpose of an
entitlement is relevant to its classification. In Pope v Pope, Hardie Boys
J dismissed an argument, which he described as being presented "with
no less courage than ingenuity", that an accident compensation payment
was separate property because it was acquired out of separate property,
that separate property being the appellant's body." 9 Similarly, in Shapleski
v Shapleski, the Court rejected a submission that lump sum compensation
was personal to the recipient and should be viewed as different from
other payments of personal funds.'20 The PRA's classification provisions
do not allow the courts to differentiate between the different types of
accident compensation. In regard to lump sum compensation the only
issue for purposes of classification under the PRA is when the entitlement
was acquired.
There has been some debate in relation to determining the date of
acquisition of an accident compensation entitlement, which affects
classification. Some courts have taken the date when the injury first
arose as the relevant date. That is consistent with the approach taken to
determining the date of accrual of a cause of action, which is generally
the date on which all the material facts required for a claim to succeed
have occurred, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff was actually
aware of those facts.121 The facts of Gill v Gill provide a useful illustration
of that principle in a relationship property context. Prior to her marriage,
Mrs Gill was fitted with a defective contraceptive device that caused
harm to her before as well as during her marriage. The cause of action
accrued as soon as more than negligible harm had been done, which was
before the marriage, and accordingly the resulting civil damages payment
was separate property. 122In other cases the courts have used the date on
which the ACA deemed the injury to have occurred. In Bowden v Bowden,
for example, the High Court disagreed with the Family Court that the
entitlement arose when Mr Bowden was first exposed to asbestos many
years before his relationship with the applicant began. The relevant date
was the date on which the ACA deemed Mr Bowden to have suffered
the injury, which was the date of diagnosis in 2010, when he was living
m1 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(1).
118 Storer v Storer, above n 113.
11 Pope v Pope HC Nelson M8-83, 20 July 1983, at 5-6.
120 Shapleski v Shapleski HC Hamilton AP34/91, 10 April 1992, at 6.
121 Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at [71].
122 Gill v Gill, above n 115, at 432-433. See also the Family Court decision in
Bowden v Bowden (FC), above n 3, at [124].
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in a de facto relationship with Ms Bowden.tu As a result, the lump sum
payment was relationship property.
The date of the entitlement is also likely to determine the classification
of earnings-related compensation, but we are not aware of any cases
where sharing of future earnings-related compensation has been
addressed.
Wiseman v Wiseman is the only case that we are aware of where
rehabilitation payments were part of a relationship property claim.
Mr Wiseman was left paraplegic as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
ACC funded modifications to the family home and a car to enable him
to be more independent. 12 4 As the family home and family chattels
are relationship property whenever they were acquired, the date of
his entitlement did not affect the classification of the assets.12 5 Nor is
there scope within the PRA to treat the increase in value of the home
attributable to the modifications as the husband's separate property."
2 Accident compensation entitlements on death
When a marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship ends on death, the
PRA operates somewhat differently. It does not treat the parties to the
relationship alike. Only the surviving spouse or partner may apply as of
right for a division of property under the PRAby electing option A." The
personal representative of the deceased requires leave from the Court to
apply for a division of relationship property, which may be granted only
if serious injustice would otherwise result.12 8 The most common reason
for seeking leave is to recover relationship property from the surviving
spouse or partner for the benefit of children from the deceased's former
relationship.12 9 For example, if Mr Bowden had left his entire estate to his
surviving de facto partner, or if she had taken his assets by survivorship,
his son might well have applied for leave to claim his father's share of
123 Bowden v Bowden (FC), above n 3, at [79].
124 Wiseman v Wiseman [1985] 1 NZLR 756 (CA).
125 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8(1)(a) and (b).
126 This would be the converse of s 9A Property (Relationships) Act 1976,
which classifies increases in value of separate property as relationship
property when the increase is attributable to the application of relationship
property or the actions of the non-owning spouse or partner.
127 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 61. Option B is not applying for a
division, in which case the surviving spouse or partner retains any assets
he or she owns, takes the benefit of any property passing by survivorship
and inherits under the deceased's will or the intestacy rules. If the
surviving spouse or partner elects option A, any gifts under the will or
intestate entitlement is automatically revoked: Property (Relationships)
Act 1976, s 76. The Court has discretion to reinstate some or all of the
inheritance if that is necessary to avoid injustice: Property (Relationships)
Act 1976, s 77.
128 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 88(2).
129 For example, Public Trust v Whyman [2015] 2 NZLR 696 (CA).
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the relationship property so that he could make a Family Protection claim
against his father's estate.'
If the surviving spouse or partner elects option A, as Ms Bowden
did, the classification provisions that would apply on separation are
modified."' All the property that Mr Bowden owned when he died is
presumed to be relationship property including anything acquired by
his estate after death, other than property that he received by way of
gift, inheritance, survivorship, or as a beneficiary of a trust settled by
a third party.132 The person disputing that classification has the burden
of rebutting the presumption."' In Bowden v Bowden it would have
been up to the deceased's son to prove that the lump sum payment his
father received was separate property, in which case the son would have
retained the balance of the payment as the surviving joint tenant of the
account. Although the judgment makes no mention of this modification to
the classification provisions in s 8, it would not have affected the outcome
in this case. The payment was held to be relationship property and the
son was therefore unable to take the full benefit of the survivorship rule.
If the deceased's lump sum payment had passed to Ms Bowden by
survivorship, it would also have been relationship property, rather than
her separate property. Section 83 of the PRA provides that any property
p assing to the surviving spouse or partner by survivorship or otherwise
but not by succession) has the same status it would have had if the
deceased had not died, unless the Court decides otherwise.'
If a partner's death was accidental, fatal entitlements might be payable.
We are not aware of any case law dealing with classification of such
entitlements under the PRA, but in our view those entitlements will not
usually be relationship property. The funeral grant is likely to be separate
property of the deceased, because it relates to the payment of a personal
130 He might well have succeeded, because the parent child relationship
has primacy in New Zealand society: Flathaug v Weaver [2003] NZFLR
730 (CA) at [32]; Public Trust v Whyman, above n 129, at [48], where the
Court of Appeal criticised the Court's refusal to grant leave in Re Williams
[2004] 2 NZLR 132 (HC), thus preventing the deceased's daughter from
enforcing payment of her Family Protection award.
131 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 75, 81-84. As s 75 refers specifically
to option A, it is not clear whether the modifications apply when the claim
is made by the personal representative of the deceased.
132 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 81 and 82.
133 In Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, s 81 should have been applied, placing
the onus on the deceased's son to rebut the presumption that his father's
ACC entitlement was relationship property. But the Court did not refer to
that provision, applying instead the inter vivos classification provisions
in s 8. The Court would have come to the same result if it had applied s
81.
134 B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC) is one of the few cases where the
Court has had the opportunity to exercise its discretion to allow the
survivorship rule to apply to a holiday home registered in the parties'
joint names, because it was just to do so in the circumstances.
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debt of the deceased.13 5 The survivor's child care payments would not
be relationship property because the entitlement is that of the child, not
the surviving spouse or partner. The survivor's grant and the survivor's
weekly compensation entitlement will not be relationship property if
they are paid to the surviving spouse or partner of the deceased, because
these entitlements arise after the relationship has ended."3 Section 84 of
the PRA does give the Court discretion to treat property acquired by a
surviving partner after death as relationship property if it is just to do so.
But it seems unlikely that the Court would do so, given that the purpose
of this entitlement is to compensate the survivor for loss of income.
C How are accident compensation entitlements divided under the
PRA?
It is apparent from the case law that the courts recognise the potential
injustice resulting from classifying accident compensation entitlements
as relationship property and have sought to address that injustice by
invoking exceptions to the presumption of equal division. That was
easier to do under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 ('the MPA') than
it is now under the PRA. Under the PRA, all relationship property is
shared equally unless there are extraordinary circumstances that would
make equal sharing repugnant to justice,'1 7 whereas under the MPA this
exception applied only to the matrimonial home and family chattels."s
Non-domestic property could be unequally divided under the MPA if one
spouse's contributions to the marriage were clearly greater than those of
the other spouse, in which case the property was divided according the
spouses' respective contributions to the marriage partnership.13 9
There are several cases under the MPA where this more liberal
exception was applied to the division of matrimonial property that
included a substantial accident compensation payment.1 0 In Fieldes v
Fieldes, for example, the Court held that a lump sum payment made to
the injured husband as compensation for the accidental loss of bodily
function and enjoyment of life could "conveniently be taken as the extent
of his greater contribution to the marriage partnership".141 Accordingly,
135 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 20 defines a 'personal debt' as a debt
that is not a 'relationship debt' and a funeral grant does not come within
any of the five categories of a relationship debt.
136 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 84.
137 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13. This exception applies also on
death.
138 That is, the matrimonial home and family chattels are shared equally
(Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 11) unless there are extraordinary
circumstances that would make doing so repugnant to justice (s 14).
139 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 15.
140 Walker v Walker (1979) 3 MPC 189 (SC) (the payment in that case was a
civil compensation payment) at 191-192, Fieldes v Fieldes (1984) 1 FRNZ
272 (HC), at 276, Law v Law DC Whakatane FP 335/82 September 1983,
(1984) 10(2) NZ Recent Law 60, Storer v Storer, above n 113, at 92-93 and
Pope v Pope, above n 119, at 8.
141 Fieldes v Fieldes, above n 140, at 276.
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the injured husband's share of the matrimonial property was the value
of the accident compensation payment plus one half of the balance of
the matrimonial property.
A notable exception is Shapleski v Shapleski, where the High Court
overturned a judgment of the Family Court that took the approach
described above. 142 In Shapleski the wife had brought $18,000 of her
own money into the marriage, which was significantly more than the
husband's $13,000 lump sum ACC payment. The High Court found
that the Family Court had erred in singling out the injured husband's
accident compensation.1 43 Taking into account the wife's contributions,
the husband's contribution was no longer clearly greater.
The extraordinary circumstances exception is more difficult to establish,
but has been successfully invoked both in relation to the matrimonial
home and family chattels and, since the amendments in 2001, to non-
domestic property. Several cases identified the personal nature of lump
sum compensation payments as an important reason for concluding that
equal sharing would be repugnant to justice. In each case, the court also
identified other reasons that made equal sharing repugnant to justice,
perhaps to avoid the impression that the exception was being used to
address the inflexibility of the classification provisions.
In Pope v Pope, for example, Hardie Boys J found that, in contrast to
earnings-related compensation, lump sum compensation was "entirely
personal" and intended to compensate the injured husband for losses he
would suffer "for the remainder of his days".'" His Honour also noted
that the payment was made near the end of the marriage, which has
long been a good reason for applying the extraordinary circumstances
exception to avoid equal division. 4
Judge Bisphan was similarly concerned about the personal nature of the
compensation paid to the husband in Storer v Storer. His Honour found
that the accident that resulted in the husband's loss of an eye was an
extraordinary circumstance and that equal sharing of the compensation
would be repugnant to justice. The accident compensation payments
"were paid to the husband to compensate him for the suffering, losses
and impairment which he endured at the time and will endure for the
rest of his life as a result of the accident".'4 He also received the payment
well after the parties ceased living together.
In Wiseman v Wiseman, the Court of Appeal also considered the personal
nature of the compensation paid to Mr Wiseman following an accident
that left him paraplegic. He used part of his lump sum compensation to
reduce the mortgage on the family home and the Corporation outlaid
$11,000 for modifications to the home to allow him to become more
142 Shapleski v Shapleski, above n 120.
143 Shapleski v Shapleski, above n 120, at 7-8.
14 Pope v Pope, above n 119, at 9.
145 See II C above.
146 Storer v Storer, above n 113, at 92-93.
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independent. Those modifications improved the value of the family
home by $9,000. Mr Wiseman's father spent a further $16,000 on the
family home for the installation of a heated pool to provide therapy for
his son. Somers J, giving judgment for the Court, stated that:1 47
The features which stand out in this narrative are that moneys received
as compensation for the grossest of physical disabilities - in part paid
for loss of amenities and in part for economic loss - have been outlaid by
the husband on the home and family chattels along with other moneys
having their source in human compassion. The total is large - over
$40,000 - and non-recurrent... The circumstances, including the receipt
of moneys by the husband and the manner of their expenditure by him,
the improvements effected to the home by the Accident Compensation
Commission, the sources of such moneys and modifications and the
reasons which occasioned the payments and work are together in our
opinion so extraordinary as to render an equal sharing of the home
repugnant to justice.
The personal nature of lump sum compensation was not considered in
Bowden v Bowden by either the Family Court or the High Court, making
the decision something of an anomaly. The Family Court found that there
were extraordinary circumstances that made equal sharing repugnant to
justice without taking into account the accident compensation payment,
having found that the payment was Mr Bowden's separate property.
The High Court overruled the Family Court on the classification point,
deciding that the accident compensation payment was relationship
property, but upheld the Family Court on the unequal division ruling
without reassessing the parties' relative contributions to the significantly
increased pool of relationship property.148 The reason for this oversight
is not obvious. Perhaps Mr Bowden's death alleviated concern about
the unfairness of equally sharing a payment intended to compensate
one partner for impairment that they would carry with them after the
end of the relationship.
Two broad propositions emerge from this case law. The first is that
accident compensation entitlements are "simply property" in the eyes
of the PRA, as Hardie Boys J put it in Pope v Pope,'49 and are relationship
property if acquired during a relationship. The second is that the personal
nature of compensation payments is considered at the division stage,
when it can justify unequal sharing (or, indeed, any sharing at all) of such
compensation payments. In the next section, we argue that the PRA and
ACA are misaligned, and the conflict between these two propositions
is a symptom of that problem, for which we propose reform in the final
section of this article.
147 Wiseman v Wiseman, above n 124, at 758. The 'Accident Compensation
Commission' is the precursor to today's Accident Compensation
Corporation. At the time, the accident compensation scheme was
administered by the Accident Compensation Commission rather than
today's Accident Compensation Corporation.
148 Bowden v Bowden, above n 2, at [54]-[56].
149 Pope v Pope, above n 119, at 6.
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V Misalignment of the PRA and ACA
The PRA and ACA are configured to pursue very different goals.
The purpose of the PRA is to recognise the parties' equal contributions
to their partnership, and to provide for a just distribution of property
associated with the partnership when the relationship ends.'5 To this
end, the PRA takes an inclusive approach to what counts as property, and
to what property is classified as relationship property. The purposes of
the ACA include providing a fair and sustainable accident compensation
scheme that seeks to rehabilitate injured persons to the maximum
extent practicable and to provide fair compensation for loss including
weekly compensation for lost earnings and lump sums for permanent
impairment.' To that end, the ACA provides for the determination of
cover and the provision of entitlements in a manner that is aimed at
achieving fairness for both the injured person and the community bearing
the costs of the scheme.
When accident compensation entitlements have to be considered in the
context of relationship property proceedings, the courts are compelled
to give priority to the PRA over the ACA because s 4A of the PRA states:
Every enactment must be read subject to this Act, unless this Act or the
other enactment expressly provides to the contrary.
There is no express contrary provision in either the PRA or the ACA.
Hence, when a relationship ends, the courts are bound to classify accident
compensation entitlements like any other property of a spouse or partner,
without regard to the special nature of these entitlements.
However, there are several sections of the ACA that point to a contrary
conclusion. Section 123(1) provides that:
All entitlements are absolutely inalienable, whether by way of, or in
accordance with, a sale, assignment, charge, execution, bankruptcy, or
otherwise.
Furthermore, s 124(1) provides that:
The Corporation must provide entitlements only to the claimant to whom
the Corporation is liable to provide the entitlements.
These sections are subject to exceptions, and allow deductions from
accident compensation payments for, among other things, child support
and attachment orders made under the District Courts Act 1947. There is
no exception for the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, even though the
classification of an accident compensation entitlement and its division
150 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 1M.
151 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 3.
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under the PRA would appear to constitute an alienation.5 2 While this
form of alienation is not a breach of the ACA, because the PRA trumps
all other enactments, the courts' approach to division of relationship
property indicates an appreciation of the conflict between the policies
underpinning these two statutes.1 5 3 This conflict is evident in the Family
Court decision in Shapleski v Shapleski, where the Court referred to the
personal nature and the inalienability of the compensation as the reason
for allocating the lump sum payment to the husband before dividing the
balance of the couple's matrimonial property equally between them.1
Other than earnings-related compensation, the accident compensation
entitlements are not contributions to the partnership and therefore ought
not to be classified as relationship property. But that classification is not
open to the courts under the current Act. The only option they have, to
recognise the personal nature of an accident compensation entitlement
is to rely on the extraordinary circumstances exception to equal division,
even though it is questionable whether an accidental injury is indeed an
extraordinary circumstance to justify applying the exception.
Another symptom of misalignment of the PRA and ACA is the difficulty
that the courts have had in determining the date of acquisition of an
accident compensation entitlement which is crucial in ascertaining
whether or not the entitlement is relationship property. In Bowden v
Bowden, Mander J found that Mr Bowden's entitlement to lump sum
compensation was acquired on the date that the ACA deemed his injury
to have occurred. Under the ACA, the date of injury is important for
several reasons. For example, cover is generally not available for injuries
suffered before the commencement of the scheme on 1 April 1974.'11
To reflect the practical need to affix some date of injury to injuries where
there is no clear date of injury, such as asbestosis that develops gradually
over a long period after exposure, the ACA provides machinery that
deems the date of injury for certain types of injuries. As Heron J observed
in Bryant v Attorney-General, the deemed date of injury is a "convenient
fiction for the fairer and better administration of the Act".'- But there is
no reason to expect that the deemed dates of injury that Parliament has
152 The few accident compensation cases on these sections are not of particular
assistance in the present context. ACC v Bailey, above n 114. Murray v
ARCIC DC Wellington 103/97 DCA 187/96 May 23 1997, which was
concerned with the recovery of debt by the Corporation from entitlement
payments to the claimant, which is specifically authorised by the ACA.
15 For a different example of a policy conflict between the ACA and another
statute, see Davies v Police [20091 NZSC 47, [2009] 3 NZLR 189, where a
majority of the Supreme Court interpreted the Sentencing Act 2002 to
give effect to their understanding of the philosophy of the ACC scheme.
This was at the expense of the goals of the Sentencing Act and Davies was
overturned by Parliament, see Simon Connell "Overturning the Social
Contract?" [2014] NZLJ 314.
154 Shapleski v Shapleski DC Thames FP 875/16/88, 9 April 1991, at 7.
155 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 359.
156 Bryant v Attorney-General HC Wellington CP44-00, 7 August 2000.
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crafted for particular types of injury should also happen to produce just
results in relationship property cases.
The PRA and ACA are therefore misaligned on a number of levels.




In November 2015, the PRA was referred to the New Zealand Law
Commission for review and reform, with a reporting date of November
2018.1'1 The terms of reference are very broad and include the classification
and division of property. So this is an opportune time to consider the
issue of accident compensation entitlements in relationship property
proceedings. As will be apparent from the foregoing analysis, the nature
and purpose of the various entitlements differ and hence we deal with
each entitlement separately in the following reform proposals.
Since section 4A of the PRA provides that other enactments are to be
read subject to the PRA, it is primarily the PRA that ought to be revised
to implement the proposed reforms. For the purposes of clarity, s 123(2)
of the ACA could also be amended to include in the list of things to which
inalienability does not apply "sections 8-10 or part 4 of the Property
(Relationships) Act 1976".11
B Rehabilitation entitlements
Generally speaking, we consider that rehabilitation entitlements ought to
be classified as separate property. This reflects both the personal nature of
most rehabilitation entitlements and the undesirability of undermining
an injured person's rehabilitation by making entitlement to rehabilitation
subject to division. This change could be achieved quite easily in relation
to personal aids and appliances, such as hearing aids, prosthetics and
wheel chairs, by specifically classifying such assets as separate property.
A different approach would be required in relation to modifications
to the family home and vehicle. If the family home and family chattels
retain their special status under the PRA,159 the modifications and
resulting increase in value will be relationship property in the absence of
a contracting out agreement. Securing the rehabilitation entitlement for
the injured spouse or partner through classification of the assets is likely
157 <www.lawcom.govt.nz / our-projects / review-property-relationships-
act-1976>.
15 Sections 8-10 classify property and part 4 deals with division of
relationship property.
159 Robert Fisher "Should a property regime be mandatory or optional?"
in Jessica Palmer, Nicola Peart, Margaret Briggs and Mark Henaghan
(eds) Modern Family Finances - Legal Perspectives (Intersentia, Cambridge)
(forthcoming), suggests that only the fruits of the partnership should be
classified as relationship property. That would exclude the family home
and family chattels acquired before the relationship began.
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to be problematic. There can be no assumption that the rehabilitation
entitlement is reflected in a corresponding increase in value that might
be classified as separate property. A modification to a vehicle may even
have diminished its value. We propose instead that the injured party's
rehabilitation payment is dealt with through division, either by deducting
the cost of the rehabilitation payment or vesting the asset in the injured
person subject to a compensation payment to the spouse or partner for the
loss of that item of relationship property. This would enable the injured
person to continue benefiting from entitlements intended to assist his or
her rehabilitation in accordance with the purpose of the ACA.
C Lump sum compensation for permanent impairment
In our view, lump sum compensation for permanent impairment should
always be classified as separate property at the point of acquisition,
because it is paid with respect to a purely personal loss of one's bodily
function. Furthermore, it is made as a one-off payment for the loss that
the injured person will suffer for the rest of his or her life, making it unjust
for an ex-partner to share in that payment at the end of a relationship.
As well as providing for a more just outcome, this reform circumvents
the problem referred to earlier of affixing a date of acquisition to lump
sum compensation. The definition of separate property in s 9 of the PRA
should be amended to include entitlement to lump sum compensation
under cl 54 of Schedule 1 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001.
If the recipient subsequently intermingles the lump sum compensation
payment with relationship property, it becomes relationship property in
the same way as an inheritance or a gift would do under s 10 of the PRA.
The personal nature of the payment may nonetheless justify unequal
division of the relationship property, as it did in Wiseman v Wiseman.
D Weekly compensation
In our view, weekly compensation acquired during a relationship should
be relationship property because it is compensation for lost earnings that
would have been relationship property had the claimant not been injured.
The PRA does not need to be amended to achieve this result. However,
there would be benefit in providing clarity on the date of acquisition of
an entitlement to weekly compensation, given the different approaches
that have emerged in the context of lump sum compensation.
We consider that the accident compensation context requires a different
approach to the one that the High Court took to post-relationship
payments under a disability insurance in Creighton v Creighton.161 While
Dr and Mrs Creighton were married, they used relationship funds to
enter into a disability insurance policy to insure Dr Creighton against
prospective loss of income. While still married, he was diagnosed with
a serious degenerative neck and upper spine condition, which led to the
insurer paying him continuous monthly benefits under the policy. It was
160 Creighton v Creighton, HC Auckland, CIV-2003-404-6892, 10 September
2004.
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accepted that the payments under the policy were relationship property
while the couple lived together in marriage. The High Court found that
the ongoing right to receive payments (provided that Dr Creighton
continued to meet the criteria for payment, which was almost certain)
was also relationship property, on the basis that the right to payment
had arisen during the relationship, and no new or fresh rights arose after
separation."'1 Dr Creighton's argument that the post-relationship lost
income payments should be separate property because post-relationship
income would be separate property was rejected on the basis that Mrs
Creighton was claiming an interest in an insurance policy against lost
income that had been purchased from relationship property, rather than
claiming any interest in Dr Creighton's future income.1 62
In our view, the same reasoning should not apply to earnings-related
weekly compensation under the ACA. The deliberate choice by a
couple to purchase an insurance policy using relationship property
should be distinguished from the compulsory social insurance accident
compensation scheme. Furthermore, the funding of the accident
compensation scheme is more complex than an individual paying
insurance premia from relationship property funds, and it is not always
the case that accident compensation payments will come from a fund
that the injured person actually contributed to.'6
We suggest that, in the relationship property context, weekly
compensation should be treated as being acquired as a result of periods
of incapacity, in the same way that earnings from work are acquired as a
result of periods of working. Effectively, a fresh entitlement to a weekly
compensation arises for each day that the claimant meets the criteria
for entitlement. Weekly compensation paid for periods of incapacity
outside a relationship should be separate property. This produces a
more just outcome, and one that more closely resembles the way that
ACA deals with earnings-related compensation, than affixing a single
date of entitlement to weekly compensation based on the date of injury
or date of payment.
Weekly compensation payments received after the end of a relationship
for an injury suffered during the relationship would be relationship
161 At [25].
162 At [391-[401.
163 For example, entitlements for work-related personal injuries are paid
out of the Work Account, which is funded by levies paid by employers
(Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 167-168). So, a person receiving
entitlements for a work-related injury has not paid levies into the fund that
their entitlements are paid from. Even in the case that a claimant is injured
in an accident that relationship money could be said to have helped fund
the account (for example a motor vehicle accident - the funding for which
comes from vehicle registrations and petrol levies), the ACA makes it dear
that there is no direct relationship between levy-paying and entitlements:
s 59(1) states that "[tihe fact that the Corporation accepts a levy does not
of itself decide the question of whether or not a person has cover" and
having paid levies is not a requirement for receiving entitlements (s 67).
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property only to the extent that the payments related to any period
before the relationship ended. To the extent that payments are intended
to cover loss of earnings after separation they would be separate property
of the injured party. Similarly, a back-payment of weekly compensation
received during a relationship with respect to a period of incapacity
prior to the relationship would be separate property. Conversely, a back-
payment of weekly compensation received after a relationship in respect




A funeral grant is paid to the estate of the deceased. Section 82 of the PRA
states that property acquired by the estate of a deceased spouse or partner
is presumed, in the absence of evidence otherwise, to be relationship
property. It could thus be argued that a funeral grant is relationship
property and subject to sharing. However, that would undermine the
purpose of the funeral grant which is to offset actual funeral costs.
Under the PRA as it currently stands, a funeral grant could be said to be
separate property either on the basis that it is property against which the
normal presumption in s 82 should not apply, or on the basis that it is
a contribution to the payment of a personal debt of the deceased under
s 20 of the PRA. To clarify the status of funeral grants, s 82 of the PRA
could be amended to exclude funeral grants paid under the ACA from
being relationship property.6 5
Survivor's child care
Survivor's child care is paid to the caregiver of the child of the deceased.'66
As the caregiver is not beneficially entitled to this payment, it would
not be property to which the PRA would apply if the caregiver was in a
relationship when the childcare payments were made.167 The PRA could
be amended to clarify this.
Survivor's weekly compensation
The purpose of survivor's weekly compensation is to compensate for
lost income and should be treated like income by the PRA. That is,
survivor's weekly compensation should be relationship property if the
recipient is in a qualifying relationship with another person at the time
164 A subsequent payment might justify setting aside a settlement agreement
under s 21J of the PRA.
165 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 82(4) could be amended to include
a reference to funeral grants.
166 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1 cl 78.
167 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2 definition of "owner".
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when entitlement is acquired.16 That takes us back to the issue discussed
previously in relation to weekly compensation for an injured person,
where we rejected the Creighton approach and argued instead that each
weekly payment is a fresh acquisition.
In our view, the Creighton approach is appropriate for survivor's weekly
compensation, because it differs from weekly compensation for an injured
person in several material respects. Eligibility for an injured person
depends on actual lost income, evidenced by incapacity, and fluctuates
depending on changing circumstances. Survivor's weekly compensation,
on the other hand, does not depend on the survivor's circumstances to
the same extent. It does not require evidence of ongoing lost income.1 6 1
For example, if the survivor marries or enters into a relationship, that
will not affect the entitlement to the survivor's weekly compensation,
regardless of the income brought in by the partner.170 Furthermore, it is
irrelevant whether the deceased would have reached retirement age, and
thus be eligible for superannuation, mitigating any lost income due to
injury.' 71 For these reasons, the Accident Compensation Act 2001 allows
a surviving spouse or partner to convert their entitlement to survivor's
weekly compensation to one or more aggregated payments.172 For the
same reasons survivor's weekly compensation should be treated by the
PRA as a one-off entitlement acquired on the date of death, rather than a
series of fresh acquisitions. Its classification should therefore depend on
whether at the date of death the recipient of the weekly compensation
was in a qualifying relationship or not.
Survivor's grants
Survivor's grants should be classified as separate property, even when
168 The possibility of survivor's weekly compensation becoming subject
to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 is more likely to occur where
dependants receive the entitlements, because there is no age restriction
on dependants, whereas children of the deceased are eligible to receive
fatal entitlements only until they attain the age of 18 or, if they are in full
time study, the age of 21. Given the age restrictions on marriage, civil
unions, and de facto relationships, children are unlikely to be receiving
fatal entitlements or their relationship will be of short duration: Property
(Relationships) Act 1976, ss 14-14AA. As we mentioned at the end of our
discussion of the division of accident compensation entitlements on death,
theoretically, the personal representative of the deceased could request
that the court classify survivor's weekly compensation paid to a spouse
or partner as relationship property in the relationship with the deceased
under Property (Relatonships) Act 1976, s 84. Bringing the survivor's
grant into the pool of relationship property would then potentially make it
subject to a claim under the Family Protection Act 1955. It seems unlikely
that such a request would ever be made and even less likely that a court
would grant it.
169 With compensation for other dependants being the exception.
170 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 66(4)(a).
171 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, cl 66(4)(c).
172 Accident Compensation Act 2001, sch 1, d 67.
